Sunday, October 25, 2009
Marantao v. CA, January 16, 2001
In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of other parties. In such case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or record on appeal, the court may only issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal In accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Generally, the special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration, so as to allow the lower court to correct the alleged error. However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:
a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
RCBC vs. Metro, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."
Mejia vs. Gabayan, G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005
The petitioner ought to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse. Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of actions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies and should be used with caution. Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is equitable. The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies.
It may be reiterated that the action for declaratory relief which originated in the classical Roman law, had been used in Scotland for four centuries and adopted in England and other European countries. The remedy is purely statutory in nature and origin. The remedy is an extension of the ancient quia timet. A declaratory judgment does not create or change substantial rights or modify any relationship or alter the character of controversies.
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004
The essential requisites of the action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
… It merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. 30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.
… Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
Paradero vs. Abragan, et al., G.R. No. 158917, March 1, 2004
The Court is aware of the doctrine that the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Indeed, it is the inadequacy — not the mere absence — of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, reiterated in the subsequent cases of Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 18 Echauz v. Court of Appeals, and International School v. Court of Appeals.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of parties in the appeal and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs sought are unidentical, although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of the writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. Clearly, there can be no forum-shopping where in one petition a party questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, as in the case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa. Hence, reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced. [International School v. Court of Appeals]
Moreover, even assuming that petitioner’s recourse to certiorari is correct, the same is still dismissible for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed to show that such special and important reasons obtain in this case.
Asian Transmission Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March 15, 2004
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.
PCGG vs. Desierto, January 19, 2001
As regards the manifestation of the Office of the Ombudsman of its willingness to have the case remanded for preliminary investigation, in PCGG vs. Desierto, the Court has also enunciated the rule that when the merits of the complaint have evidently and thoroughly been examined by the Ombudsman, it would not be right to yet subject respondents to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish. The Court finds no cogent reason to divert in the instant case from making that same pronouncement.
ELPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."
Santos, v. CA, GR 141947, July 5, 2001
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED, G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001
We hold that respondent's Petition for Certiorari was seasonably filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered was not the Order of August 14, 1998, but the date when respondent received the December 9, 1998 Order declaring it in default. Since it received this Order only on January 13, 1999, and filed its Petition for Certiorari on February 23, 1999, it obviously complied with the sixty-day reglementary period stated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Moreover, the August 14, 1998 Order was not a proper subject of certiorari or appeal, since it was merely an interlocutory order.
Petitioner also contends that certiorari cannot prosper in this case, because respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing its Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Respondent counters that reconsideration should be dispensed with, because the December 9, 1998 Order is a patent nullity.
The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that a petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. It is patently clear that the regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. Hence, the haste with which the solicitor general raised these issues before the appellate court is understandable. For the reason mentioned, we rule that respondent's Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for reconsideration.
Olan vs. CA, G.R. No. 116109, September 14, 1999
Finally, it must be pointed out that the writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of "newly discovered evidence". Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
Liga v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . . required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
DBP vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 145908, January 22, 2004
Basic is the doctrine that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be the subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered. But this rule is not absolute.
Indeed, where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued in excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Perez vs. Ombudsman, May 27, 2004
As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct in availing of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in filing it in the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman and Mendoza-Arce vs. Ombudsman, requiring that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman's orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule.
But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court, we would have dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ombudsman resolution.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
La Bugal-B'laan vs. Ramos, January 27, 2004
We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, it is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now.
Lopez vs. Ombudsman, September 6, 2001
This Court has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority."
G & S Transport vs. CA, May 28, 2002
It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations. Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA will enter into a contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the international airport is entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does not involve a duty the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus this Court cannot direct the exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determination of the winning bidders should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA which is the agency in the best position to evaluate the proposals and to decide which bid would most complement the NAIA's services.
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
DBP vs. Aguirre, September 7, 2001
However, although the notice of foreclosure sale was duly published, the sale did not take place as scheduled on September 25, 1985. Instead, it was held more than two months after the published date of the sale or on January 7, 1986. This renders the sale void. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale. Although the lack of republication of the notice of sale has not been raised in this case, this Court is possessed of ample power to look into a relevant issue, such as the lack of jurisdiction to hold the foreclosure sale.
Metrobank v. Wong, June 26, 2001
It is bad enough that the mortgagor has no choice but to yield his property in a foreclosure proceeding. It is infinitely worse, if prior thereto, he was denied of his basic right to be informed of the impending loss of his property. This is another instance when law and morals echo the same sentiment.
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. Precisely, the purpose of a stipulation in the contract for an additional requirement is to apprise respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void.
Unlike in Olizon where there was a valid publication of the notice of foreclosure sale, the publication in the case at bar was defective. Not only did it fail to conform with the requirement that the notice must be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but also, there were substantial errors in the notice of sale published in the Pagadian Times as found by the scrutinizing eyes of the trial court.
Figuracion-Gerilla vs. Vda. De Figuracion, August 22, 2006
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Varona vs. CA, May 20, 2004
It is settled that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Lopez vs. David, March 30, 2004
Under Section 1 of Rule 70, the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioners’ Complaint was filed beyond one year from the time that respondents’ possession allegedly became unlawful.
We have ruled that “forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.” Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MeTC when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.
Del Rosario vs. Sps. Manuel, January 16, 2004
As found by the trial court, petitioner's possession of the land was by mere tolerance of the respondents. We have held in a number of cases that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required to leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a contract, that he will vacate upon demand.
Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs. CA, September 3, 2003
It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.
Sps. Tirona v. Alejo, October 10, 2001
A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners' action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.
Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners' actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.
Uy v. Santiago, July 31, 2000
Private respondents' argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them of their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We must stress that what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and shall not have any effect on the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it must be remembered that ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.
Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed, mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.
Cansino vs. CA, August 21, 2003
It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and prove that they had prior physical possession of the property before they were unlawfully deprived thereof by defendants. Respondents, being the complainants before the lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of prior possession.
Lariosa vs. Bandala, August 15, 2003
Ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social order which must be addressed as promptly as possible. Respondent Judge has acted within the bounds of his authority in issuing the orders for the alias writ of execution and the alias writ of demolition.
Bustos vs. CA, January 24, 2001
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Laurora vs. Sterling, April 9, 2003
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership.
Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror — not even by the owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present case, the party who proves prior possession — in this case, petitioners — can recover possession even from the owners themselves.
Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.
The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by claimants out to gain possession. The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. They should go to court and seek judicial vindication.
Macrohon vs. Ibay, November 30, 2006
Those who don the judicial robe have been reminded time and again that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. It has repeatedly been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of Justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."
Bugaring vs. Español, January 19, 2001
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.
De Leon vs. CA, February 5, 2004
The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.
Espinosa vs. CA, May 28, 2004
Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine, a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing. The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt. In cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errant's bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed.
Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.
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We do not share your personally identifiable information to any third party for marketing purposes. However, we may share information with governmental agencies or other companies assisting us in fraud prevention or investigation. We may do so when: (1) permitted or required by law; or, (2) trying to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud or unauthorized transactions; or, (3) investigating fraud which has already taken place.
Commitment to Data Security
Your personally identifiable information is kept secure. Only authorized staff of this site (who have agreed to keep information secure and confidential) have access to this information. All emails and newsletters from this site allow you to opt out of further mailings.
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